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Abstract 
 
Empirical studies show that intrinsic motivations increase the volunteer labour supply. This paper studies how 
monetary rewards to volunteers affect their intrinsic motivations. Using a sample of Italian volunteers, allowing 
to distinguish the type of volunteer, the paper shows that monetary rewards (extrinsic motivations) influence 
positively the choice to donate voluntary hours, while a low intrinsic motivation seems to decrease hours per 
week. Moreover, monetary rewards increase the hours per week of individuals with low intrinsic motivation. 
Thus, a crowding in effect on low intrinsic motivation might emerge for continuative volunteers. 
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1. Introduction 
Volunteering is a complex phenomenon the explanation of which transcends the limits of one 
single approach as different disciplines such as anthropology, psychology, sociology and 
economics offer insights into the motives for volunteering. The motivational reasons to 
explain volunteering behaviour have been classified into the following two groups (Hackl et 
al. 2007). One group focuses on internal rewards due to intrinsic motivation originating from 
helping others per se. Because people enjoy helping others, no other (material) reward is 
necessary to motivate people. Meier and Stutzer (2004) distinguish three subcomponents of 
intrinsic motivation: (i) people care about recipient’s utility and benefit from the result of their 
effort1; (ii) volunteers enjoy their work per se and intrinsically benefit from the act of 
volunteering (Deci and Ryan 1985); (iii) helping others triggers warm-glow benefits as the 
knowledge of conducing to a good cause is utility increasing (Andreoni 1990). The other 
group of motives does not refer to the enjoyment of volunteer behaviour per se but to the 
increase in utility due to extrinsic rewards from volunteering. Helping others is then 
secondary and volunteers rather expect external benefits and payoffs. Two extrinsic rewards 
can be distinguished: (i) volunteering can be undertaken as an investment in human capital. 
Individuals engage in volunteer activities to raise future earnings on the labour market 
(Menchik and Weisbrod 1987); (ii) people can volunteer in order to invest in social network. 
Through engagement in volunteer work, social contacts evolve which can be valuable for 
getting employment. 
A widespread body of empirical literature stresses extrinsic motives for voluntary activities2. 
For example, Menchik and Weisbrod (1987), Brown and Lankford (1992) show that an 
increase in the (market) cost opportunity of giving should reduce voluntary labour supply. 
Day and Devlin (1996) find that total income is an important determinant of the decision to 
volunteer. Freeman (1997) shows empirical findings in line with Menchik and Weisbrod 
(1985), while Hackl et al. (2007) find strong evidence for the investment model in human 
capital. 
However, the empirical literature investigating the role of both intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivations in explaining the individual decision to volunteer is still insufficient. A recent 
empirical paper confirms the importance of intrinsic motivation in explaining volunteering. 
                                                 
1
 For a survey on theories see Fehr and Schmidt (2003). 
2
 For a survey see Cappellari and Turati (2004), Hackl et al. (2007). 
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Cappellari and Turati (2004) find for a sample of Italian workers that intrinsically motivated 
individuals are more likely to volunteer that extrinsically motivated ones. 
Moreover, there is not enough evidence how volunteers would respond if their work were 
partially paid. In fact, the application of this instrument may, under identifiable conditions, 
either enhance or damage internal motivation people have to behave in a desired way. Recent 
research suggests that external reward may reduce intrinsic motivation. Frey and Götte (1999) 
find that direct monetary compensation reduces voluntary work by affecting intrinsic 
motivation. This is the so-called “crowding-out effect” proposed by Frey (1992): an increase 
in direct reward to volunteering “crowds-out” labour supply by reducing intrinsic motivation. 
The most famous and most quoted empirical example of the “crowding-out effect” is Titmuss 
(1970) observation about differences in blood giving between the UK and the USA. Total (per 
capita) supply of blood is significantly greater in the UK, where giving is voluntary and 
unpaid, than in the USA, where a market for blood does exist. Furthermore, many laboratory 
experiments support motivational effect (McGraw, 1978). 
This paper analyses how monetary rewards to volunteers affect their intrinsic motivations 
using a Survey on Employment in the Social Care and Educational Services conducted by the 
Istituto di Studi sullo Sviluppo delle Aziende Nonprofit (ISSAN) (see Borzaga 2000; Borzaga 
and Musella 2004). 
The paper shows the following preliminary results. First, monetary rewards increase volunteer 
labour supply. Second, a low intrinsic motivation decreases continuative voluntary labour. 
Finally, among continuative volunteers, monetary rewards increase the hours of individuals 
with a low intrinsic motivation. Thus, this finding seems to support a crowding in effect for 
continuative volunteers with a low intrinsic motivation. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 shortly summarize crowding theory and develops 
the hypothesis to be tested. Section 3 presents the data and section 4 the econometric 
estimates. Section 5 concludes.  
2. Crowding-out theory 
Human behaviour is influenced by both extrinsic and intrinsic motivations. The former is 
activated from outside, the latter relate to activities one simply undertakes because one likes 
to do them ore because the individual derives some satisfaction from doing his or her duty. 
According to cognitive social psychology (Deci 1971, 105) “one is said to be intrinsically 
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motivated to perform an activity when one receives no apparent reward except the activity 
itself”. Social psychologists have argued that there are “hidden costs of reward” (Lepper and 
Greene 1978), and that monetary rewards may reduce intrinsic motivation (Deci e Ryan 1985; 
Lane 1991). From a rational point of view, if a person derives intrinsic benefits simply by 
behaving in an altruistic manner, paying her for this service reduces her option of indulging in 
altruistic feelings. Her intrinsic motivation then has a reduced effect on supply (Frey and 
Oberholzer-Gee 1997).  
Motivation crowding theory tries to mediate between psychological theory and the standard 
economic theory that does not normally differentiate between different sources of motivation, 
and according to which intrinsic motivation is an exogenously given constant. Motivation 
crowding theory allows a whole spectrum of possible combinations of intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivations between two polar cases: purely intrinsically (only intrinsically motivated) and 
purely extrinsically (only extrinsically motivated) individuals. Such movement is attributed to 
a change in preference. This approach allows obtaining empirically testable hypothesis in 
settings where intrinsic motivation is assumed to play a role (Frey and Jegen 2001). 
Motivation crowding theory represents a generalization for economics in three respect (Frey 
1994; Frey and Götte 1999; Frey and Jegen 2001):  
(1) Intrinsic motivation can be systematically affected not only by money, but any 
external intervention. In the standard economic principal-agent theory, external 
intervention increases the marginal monetary benefit of performing. This is the 
relative price effect of external intervention;  
(2) Intrinsic motivation may be crowded out or crowded in. In the first case the 
external intervention undermines intrinsic motivation ad thus negatively affects 
the agent’s marginal benefit from performing. In the second case external 
intervention raises intrinsic motivation increasing the marginal benefit of 
performing;  
(3) In general, it is important to simultaneously consider the crowding-out effect and 
the relative price effect, thus the external intervention has two opposite effects on 
the agent’s performance. 
The identified psychological conditions under which the crowding-out effect appear are two: 
i) external interventions crowd out intrinsic motivation if the individuals affected perceive 
them to be controlling. In that case, both self-determination and self-esteem suffer, and the 
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individuals react by reducing their intrinsic motivation in the activity controlled: ii) external 
interventation crowd in intrinsic motivation if the individuals concerned perceive it as 
supportive. In that case, self-esteem is fostered, and individuals feel that they are more 
freedom to act, thus enlarging self-determination (Frey 1992). 
There are a large number of studies that offering an empirical evidence in support of the 
existence of crowding-out and crowding-in effects (for a survey see Frey and Jegen 2001). In 
the field of labour supply in voluntary sector, motivation crowding theory has been  
empirically studied by Frey and Götte (1999). 
Frey and Götte (1999) use a unique data set from Switzerland to evaluate how financial 
rewards to volunteers affect their intrinsic motivation. This is done in a principal-agent 
relationship3. The volunteer in the role of agent chooses the optimal amount of work effort 
(input of hours). The manager as the principal of the respective non-profit organization offers 
direct reward to influence the volunteer work supply. The utility U(V, R) and the cost C(V,R) 
of volunteering depends on hours volunteered V and on direct reward R made to volunteer. 
Utility function U(.) and cost function C(.) show standard properties: marginal benefit is 
decreasing (UV>0, UVV<0), whereas marginal cost is increasing (CV>0, CVV>0), Rational 
individuals choose that amount of volunteering V that maximizes their net benefit i.e. UV - 
CV=0. A change in direct reward R has the following impact on volunteer work (by the 
envelope theorem) 
dR
dVCC
dR
dVUU VVVRVVVR
∗∗
+=+                                        (1) 
and rearranging 
VVVV
VRVR
UC
CU
dR
dV
−
−
=
∗
                                                  (2) 
 
Given that the denominator is positive, the change in marginal benefit and in marginal cost 
inducted by the change in R determines the sign of expression (2). When VRU and VRC is both 
different from zero, the sign of expression (2) is undetermined, when either VRU and VRC is 
zero there is a clear behavioural response following an increase in R. According to Frey and 
Götte two polar cases may be distinguished. At one extreme, an increase in the direct reward 
causes a relative price effect because it lowers the opportunity cost of volunteering ( VRC < 0). 
                                                 
3
 See also Frey (1992), Frey (1994), Cappellari and Turati (2004). 
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If no crowding-out effect exists ( VRU = 0), an increase in the direct reward increases the 
supply of voluntary work: 0>∗ dRdV . At the other extreme, an increase in the direct reward 
causes a crowding-out effect because it undermines the marginal utility of volunteering 
( VRU <0). If they’re in no relative price effect ( VRC = 0), an increase in the direct reward 
reduces the supply of voluntary work: 0<∗ dRdV . In general, because both the relative price 
effect and the crowding-out effect are active, i.e. VRU and VRC is both different from zero, the 
total effect of the direct reward on work performance depends on the relative size of the two 
countervailing effects. So which effect prevails is an empirical matter. 
Frey and Götte (1999) empirically finding that the direct reward reduces the amount of 
volunteering. While the size of the reward induces individuals to provide more volunteer 
work, the mere fact that they receive a payment significantly reduces their work efforts. 
Hence, the indirect effect (that reduces intrinsic motivation) dominates the direct effect of the 
reward. 
In this paper the propositions to be tested are: 
Hypothesis 1: individuals who receive rewards for volunteering will offer more hours of work 
(relative price effect). 
Hypothesis 2 individuals who have high intrinsic motivations will offer more hours of work.  
Hypothesis 3: individuals intrinsically motivated who receive a payment will reduce their 
work efforts (crowding-out effect). 
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
The empirical analysis is based on the Survey on Employment in the Social Care and 
Educational Services conducted by the Istituto di Studi sullo Sviluppo delle Aziende Nonprofit 
(ISSAN) on state, for profit and non-profit organizations operating in the supply of a limited 
number of personal facilities: Assistance and guardianship, Nursing/rehabilitation, 
Educational, Cultural, Recreational, School and school-to-work guidance, Job-search 
assistance and others (see for further details Borzaga 2000). The survey was carried out in the 
first semester of 1998 in nine regions providing information regards 730 voluntary workers on 
time spent in volunteering, reimbursements, work motivations and personal characteristics.  
In particular, the survey asks individuals how often they have volunteered in for profit and 
non-profit organizations and how many hours they have devoted to voluntary work. Based on 
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these questions, the paper considers both continuative volunteer work (hours per week) and 
occasional volunteer work (hours per month).  
The propositions of previous section indicate that empirical analyses on crowding effect 
require the measurement of reimbursements and intrinsic motivations. One of the main 
advantages of the data set ISSAN is that it provides detailed information on reimbursements 
and work motivations of volunteers. Based on first information, I form a dummy for 
reimbursements, assuming value 1 if volunteers have received reimbursements for their 
activity and 0 otherwise. Based on second information and following Frey (1997), I identify 
intrinsic motivations from a question in which individuals are asked if they are in agreement 
that “voluntary work is a moral duty”. I define three dummies for intrinsic motivations, 
which equals 1 for individuals who are in disagreement, medium in agreement and in 
agreement with the question and 0 otherwise. According to the discussion in the previous 
Section, reimbursements and intrinsic motivations should play a role in crowding-out (-in) 
effect. 
Table 1 reports an overview of the descriptive statistics. On average, approximately, 10 hours 
per week and 14 hours per month are devoted to voluntary work in social services. 23 percent 
of continuative volunteers receive monetary compensation while only 18 percent of receive 
rewards. 26 percent of the sample of both type of volunteers is characterized by a low 
intrinsic motivation while only 18 percent of occasional volunteers show a high intrinsic 
motivation (against 27 percent of continuative ones). If we consider jointly continuative and 
occasional volunteers, we can observe from table 1 that completed high school is some 30 
percent lower than national-wide representative statistics while College/graduate is some 10 
percent higher than representative statistics (see Indagine Multiscopo sulla Famiglia from 
ISTAT, 1997). As for the rest of observed characteristics, the incidence of female is rather 
high while observations are not evenly distributed across Italian regions.  
The number of hours volunteered, the share of persons receiving monetary compensation and 
the fraction of individuals who are characterized by intrinsic motivations differ between male 
and female and also between individuals who are employed in the market and those who are 
not (table 2). Histogram among intrinsic motivations and monetary rewards are showed in 
figure 1 and figure 2. Correlations and conditional dependence among intrinsic motivations 
and monetary rewards are showed in table 3. 
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Table 1 – sample means 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
°N=539, Missing on hours per week=34 
§N=184, Missing on hours per month=28 
 
Table 2 – Volunteering stratified according to  
 Continuative volunteer work Occasional volunteer work 
 Male Female Employed Non-Employed Male Female Employed 
Non-
Employed 
Average hours 
per week 8.08 11.44 7.47 10.65     
Average hours 
per month     15.93 13.05 11.01 15.68 
Fraction of 
volunteers who 
receive rewards 
0.32 0.18 0.28 0.21 0.17 0.20 0.15 0.19 
Low intrinsic 
motivation 0.20 0.31 0.26 0.28 0.31 0.23 0.29 0.25 
High intrinsic 
motivation 0.28 0.26 0.26 0.28 0.18 0.17 0.11 0.21 
 
 
 
Continuative volunteer 
work° 
Occasional volunteer 
work§ 
Variable  Mean Mean 
Hours per week 9.79  
Hours for month  14.24 
Female  0.63 0.61 
Married 0,39 0.41 
Age31-40 0.16 0.16 
Age41-50 0.13 0.13 
Age51-60 0.15 0.08 
Age>61 0.16 0.09 
Completed elementary (5 yrs) 0.05 0.06 
Completed junior high school (8 yrs) 0.18 0.17 
College/Graduate (>20 yrs) 0.19 0.15 
Reimbursements 0.23 0.18 
Low intrinsic motivation 0.27 0.26 
High intrinsic motivation 0.27 0.17 
Employed 0.27 0.37 
Piemonte 0.17 0.08 
Lombardia 0.07 0.15 
Trentino 0.11 0.16 
Friuli 0.02 0.01 
Toscana 0.14 0.09 
Campania 0.19 0.13 
Calabria 0.05 0.07 
Sicilia 0.03 0 
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Fig. 1 - Reimbursments and intrinsic motivation for continuative volunteers
0
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Fig. 2 - Reimbursments and intrinsic motivation for occasional volunteers
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Table 3 – Correlations and conditional dependence* 
 Continuative volunteer work Occasional volunteer work 
 Low intrinsic 
motivation 
High intrinsic 
motivation 
Low intrinsic 
motivation 
High intrinsic 
motivation 
Monetary rewards  -0.05 -0.03 -0.22*** 0.13 
Monetary rewards* -0.04 -0.01 -0.27*** 0.10 
Note: *Probit equations with which intrinsic motivations are regressed against the reimbursements plus the set of 
controls indicated in table 1. *** Indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent level. 
4. Economic framework 
In this Section I provide empirical tests of my hypotheses. First, I study how individuals react 
when considering both reimbursements and intrinsic motivations. Next, I assess the crowding-
out (-in) effect. 
4.1 Estimation and empirical results 
A simple way to assess theoretical hypotheses is by means of OLS equations with which 
volunteering hours are regressed against the set of controls plus the reimbursements and 
intrinsic motivations dummies, and the reimbursements multiplied for intrinsic motivations 
dummies 
                                                      Vi = β’Xi  + γRi + δEi + εi                                                   (3) 
                                                      Vi = β’Xi  + γRi + δEi + λRiEi+ εi                                       (4) 
Where Vi are hours of volunteer work, Xi is the vector of explanatory variables, Ri is the 
vector of the reimbursements, Ei is the vector of the intrinsic motivations dummies, RiEi is the 
combined term and εi is the random error term. The set of controls included in Xi corresponds 
to the personal characteristics and to the regional dummies listed in table 1. 
Results from the estimation of equation (3) for both occasional volunteer work and 
continuative volunteer work are reported in table 4. According to the discussion in the Section 
2, reimbursements and intrinsic motivations induce volunteers to provide more volunteer 
work, Thus, hypotheses 1 is tested by looking the sign of the coefficient on reimbursements 
dummy while hypotheses 2 is tested by looking the sign of the coefficients on intrinsic 
motivations. Both are expected to increase volunteering labor. Looking the signs of the 
variables calculated multiplying the reimbursements for the intrinsic motivations tests 
hypothesis 3. If the coefficients of these variables are decreasing, the hypothesis of crowding 
out will be verified. Results from the estimation of equation (4) are showed in table 5.  
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Table 4 – Statistical test of reimbursements and intrinsic motivations 
Notes: Dependent variables in natural logarithms (ln(hours)). White standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** 
Indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent level, 5 percent level and 1 percent level. Reference category for 
dummy variables: male, non-married, Age<30, completed high school (13 yrs), does not report reimbursements 
and medium intrinsic motivations, non-employed, Veneto. D=dropped. 
 
Estimates in table 4, from continuative volunteer work (hours per week), show that the 
coefficient on reimbursements shifts volunteer labour in the expected direction. The 
coefficient is positive and significant at 1 percent level. This is consistent with relative price 
effect. On the other hand, the coefficients on intrinsic motivations presents the expected signs, 
but they are not significantly different from zero. Thus, there is not an empirical evidence that 
intrinsic motivations would increase continuative voluntary labour.  
As far the other estimated coefficients, continuative volunteer work in the social services is 
positively associated with geographical location in Friuli, Campania and Calabria. 
Surprisingly, respect the pattern emerged from the descriptive analysis of table 1, hours per  
Variable  Coefficients Coefficients 
  
Continuative volunteer work  
(Hours per week) 
Occasional volunteer work  
(Hours per month) 
   
Female   -0.19**                                 (0.08)    -0.16                                  (0.16) 
Married  -0.32***                               (0.10)    0.12                                  (0.20) 
Age31-40  -0.03                                     (0.14)   -0.05                                  (0.26) 
Age41-50   0.41***                                (0.14)  -0.36                                   (0.25) 
Age51-60   0.30*                                    (0.15)  -0.84**                               (0.38) 
Age>61   0.23                                      (0.15)  -0.16                                  (0.30) 
Completed elementary (5 yrs)   0.14                                      (0.19)  -0.18                                  (0.26) 
Completed junior high school (8 yrs)  -0.22**                                  (0.10)   0.49**                               (0.22) 
College/Graduate (>20 yrs)  -0.14                                      (0.10)   0.12                                   (0.25) 
Reimbursements   0.50***                                (0.09)   0.63***                             (0.20) 
Low Intrinsic motivation   -0.14                                      (0.09)   0.00                                   (0.18) 
High intrinsic motivation   0.00                                      (0.08)    0.37*                                 (0.22) 
Employed  -0.25***                                (0.09)  -0.35**                               (0.17) 
Piemonte  -0.50***                                (0.12)   0.32                                   (0.29) 
Lombardia   -0.02                                     (0.18)   0.35                                   (0.29) 
Trentino  -0.46***                                (0.13)   -0.05                                  (0.21) 
Friuli   0.91***                                (0.32)   1.13***                             (0.24) 
Toscana  -0.15                                     (0.14)  -0.18                                   (0.27) 
Campania   0.38***                                (0.12)   0.27                                   (0.30) 
Calabria   0.47**                                  (0.22)  - 0.19                                  (0.31) 
Sicilia  -0.19                                      (0.21)                           D 
No. obs. 465 132 
R2(adjusted) 0.29 0.30 
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Table 5 – Statistical test of crowding effect. 
Notes: Dependent variables in natural logarithms (ln(hours)). White standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent level, 5 percent level and 1 percent level. Reference category for 
dummy variables: male, non-married, Age<30, completed high school (13 yrs), does not report reimbursements 
and medium intrinsic motivations, reimbursements multiplied 0or medium intrinsic motivations, non-employed, 
Veneto. D=dropped. 
 
week are negatively associated with female. Not surprisingly, instead, the cost opportunity of 
time reduces hours volunteered. The coefficients on married variable and on employed 
variable are negative and significant. The age distribution dummies show that old individuals 
volunteer more then young individuals, while the year schooling dummies indicate that 
individuals with completed junior high school volunteer less than individuals with completed 
high school. 
 
Variable  Coefficients Coefficients 
  
Continuative volunteer work  
(Hours per week) 
Occasional volunteer work  
(Hours per month) 
   
Female   -0.18**                                 (0.08)    -0.17                                 (0.17) 
Married  -0.31***                               (0.10)    0.15                                  (0.21) 
Age31-40  -0.04                                     (0.14)  -0.07                                  (0.26) 
Age41-50   0.40***                                (0.14)  -0.39                                   (0.25) 
Age51-60   0.29*                                    (0.15)  -0.91**                               (0.38) 
Age>61   0.23                                      (0.15)  -0.19                                  (0.33) 
Completed elementary (5 yrs)   0.14                                      (0.19)  -0.15                                  (0.28) 
Completed junior high school (8 yrs)  -0.22**                                  (0.10)   0.46**                               (0.23) 
College/Graduate (>20 yrs)  -0.14                                      (0.10)   0.10                                   (0.25) 
Reimbursements   0.34***                                (0.13)   0.62**                               (0.24) 
Low intrinsic motivation   -0.23**                                  (0.10)   0.02                                   (0.20) 
High intrinsic motivation  -0.04                                      (0.10)    0.28                                   (0.23) 
R*Low intrinsic motivation   0.46*                                    (0.23) -0.46                                    (0.43) 
R* High intrinsic motivation   0.17                                      (0.18)   0.47                                   (0.58) 
Employed  -0.23***                                (0.09)  -0.39**                               (0.18) 
Piemonte  -0.50***                                (0.12)   0.34                                   (0.30) 
Lombardia   -0.04                                     (0.19)   0.33                                   (0.29) 
Trentino  -0.45***                                (0.13)  -0.06                                  (0.21) 
Friuli   0.88***                                (0.31)   1.09***                             (0.25) 
Toscana  -0.15                                     (0.14)  -0.15                                   (0.27) 
Campania   0.38***                                (0.12)   0.28                                   (0.30) 
Calabria   0.47**                                  (0.22)  - 0.20                                  (0.33) 
Sicilia  -0.18                                      (0.22)                           D 
No. obs. 465 132 
R2(adjusted) 0.30 0.31 
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Moving to results to occasional volunteer work (hours per month), it can be observed in table 
4 that the coefficient on reimbursements is again positive and significant at 1 percent level. 
Thus, a relative price effect also works for occasional voluntary labor. The coefficient on high 
intrinsic motivation presents a positive sign and it is statistically significant at 10 percent 
level. This weak finding seems to evidence that high intrinsic motivation would increase 
occasional voluntary labour.  
As far the other estimated coefficients, occasional volunteer work in the social services is 
positively associated with geographical location in Friuli. Again, the cost opportunity of time 
reduces hours volunteered, while old individuals volunteer less then young individuals. 
Surprisingly, individuals with completed junior high school volunteer more than individuals 
with completed high school. 
Looking the crowding effect, the empirical evidence of table 5 shows that monetary rewards 
help individuals with low intrinsic motivation to offer more hours per week. This finding 
would support a crowding in effect on low intrinsic motivation. Instead, neither a crowding 
out nor a crowding in effect  is obtained for the occasional volunteers. 
In the attempt to understand the effect of the monetary incentive on the individuals with 
various intrinsic motivations, I narrow the analysis separating the individuals with low 
intrinsic motivation from those with high intrinsic motivation. Results are showed in tables 6 
– 94. 
Empirical findings of tables 6-9 explain the following preliminary results. First, monetary 
rewards increase volunteer labour supply both of continuative volunteers and of occasional 
ones. Second, monetary rewards increase the hours of individuals with low intrinsic 
motivation. Thus, a crowding in effect on low intrinsic motivation of the continuative 
volunteers must exist. Finally, among occasional volunteers, monetary incentives seem to 
increase the hours of individuals with high intrinsic motivation, but this evidence is not 
statistically significant. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 I have run Tobit equations obtaining similar results. 
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Table 6 – Statistical test of reimbursements and low intrinsic motivations 
Variable  Coefficients Coefficients 
  
Continuative volunteer work  
(Hours per week) 
Occasional volunteer work  
(Hours per month) 
 
 
 
Reimbursements   0.49***                                 (0.09) 0.64***                                   (0,21) 
Low intrinsic motivation  -0.14                                        (0.08) -0.04                                        (0,18) 
     
Individual controls Yes Yes 
Regions Yes Yes 
   
No. obs. 465 132 
R2(adjusted) 0.29 0.29 
Notes: Dependent variables in natural logarithms (ln(hours)). White standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** 
Indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent level, 5 percent level and 1 percent level. Reference category for 
dummy variables: male, non-married, Age<30, completed high school (13 yrs), does not report reimbursements 
and medium intrinsic motivations, non-employed, Veneto. 
 
Table 7 – Statistical test of reimbursements and high intrinsic motivations 
 
Notes: Dependent variables in natural logarithms (ln(hours)). White standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent level, 5 percent level and 1 percent level. Reference category for 
dummy variables: male, non-married, Age<30, completed high school (13 yrs), does not report reimbursements 
and medium intrinsic motivations, non-employed, Veneto. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable  Coefficients Coefficients 
  
Continuative volunteer work  
(Hours per week) 
Occasional volunteer work  
(Hours per month) 
 
 
 
Reimbursements 0.50***                                  (0.09) 0.63***                               (0,20)          
High intrinsic motivation  0.05                                        (0.08) 0.37*                                   (0.21) 
     
Individual controls Yes Yes 
Regions Yes Yes 
   
No. obs. 465 132 
R2(adjusted) 0.29 0.30 
 15
Table 8 - Statistical test of crowding effect separated for intrinsic motivation: low. 
Notes: Dependent variables in natural logarithms (ln(hours)). White standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** 
Indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent level, 5 percent level and 1 percent level. Reference category for 
dummy variables: male, non-married, Age<30, completed high school (13 yrs), does not report reimbursements 
and medium intrinsic motivations, reimbursements multiplied for medium intrinsic motivations, non-employed, 
Veneto.  
 
 
Table 9 - Statistical test of crowding effect separated for intrinsic motivation: high. 
Variable  Coefficients Coefficients 
  
Continuative volunteer work  
(Hours per week) 
Occasional volunteer work  
(Hours per month) 
 
 
 
Reimbursements 0.49***                                   (0.11) 0.56***                                (0.21) 
High Intrinsic motivation  0.04                                         (0.09) 0.28                                      (0.22) 
R*High intrinsic motivation 0.02                                         (0.17) 0.53                                      (0.56) 
   
Individual controls Yes Yes 
Regions Yes Yes 
   
No. obs. 465 132 
R2(adjusted) 0.29 0.31 
Notes: Dependent variables in natural logarithms (ln(hours)). White standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** 
Indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent level, 5 percent level and 1 percent level. Reference category for 
dummy variables: male, non-married, Age<30, completed high school (13 yrs), does not report reimbursements 
and medium intrinsic motivations, reimbursements multiplied for medium intrinsic motivations, non-employed, 
Veneto.  
 
 
 
 
 
Variable  Coefficients Coefficients 
  
Continuative volunteer work  
(Hours per week) 
Occasional volunteer work  
(Hours per month) 
 
 
 
Reimbursements   0.40***                                (0.10)   0.70***                             (0.22) 
Low Intrinsic motivation  -0.21**                                  (0.10) -0.00                                    (0.19) 
R*Low Intrinsic motivation   0.37*                                    (0.22) -0.55                                    (0.41) 
   
Individual controls Yes Yes 
Regions Yes Yes 
   
No. obs. 465 132 
R2(adjusted) 0.30 0.31 
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5. Preliminary conclusions 
This paper have analysed the role of monetary rewards and intrinsic motivations in the 
decision to supply voluntary hours. Several studies have pointed out that intrinsic motivations 
may be important for volunteering (Freeman 1997; Cappellari and Turati 2004). In particular, 
Cappellari and Turati (2004) have found for a sample of Italian workers that intrinsically 
motivated individuals are more likely to volunteer that extrinsically motivated ones. 
This paper has used a data set on a sample of Italian volunteers to evaluate how financial 
rewards to volunteers affect their intrinsic motivations. It has found that monetary rewards 
(extrinsic motivations) influence positively the choice to donate voluntary hours, while a high 
intrinsic motivation seems to increase only hours per month. Moreover, monetary rewards 
increase the hours per week of individuals with low intrinsic motivation. Thus, a crowding in 
effect on low intrinsic motivation seems to emerge for continuative volunteers. 
Obviously, further investigations are required. These results might well be affected by sample 
selection bias on missing values and by simultaneity bias on intrinsic motivations. 
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